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The pressure groups vie for individuals' endorsements because society's decision depends negatively on so, the share of the individuals who support p = o, and positively on sl, the share who support p = i. Naturally, so+ s1 < i. For expositional convenience, I assume that the decision function has the form p =(i -s+Si), (I) according to whichp necessarily lies in the interval [o, i] . Note that this function accords no influence to preferences favouring intermediate policies. The justification for this feature is that the costs of preference aggregation lead societies to ignore preferences held by unorganised groups, especially if they lack numerical strength. Indeed, the administrative and legislative branches of government generally pay little attention to policy proposals that appear to lack the organised support of a sizeable group.4
The Individual's Preference Declaration Decision
Each individual decides what position to advocate publicly on the basis of three considerations.
First is his utility stemming directly' from society's policy choice. This is measured by his 'direct benefit' function, Bi(p), where i indexes the individual. The form of this function, which for the time being is taken to be predetermined, reflects the preference ordering he would provide in a secret ballot. I assume that there exists a unique policy that tops this ordering. This is xt, his privately held preference, or simply, his private preference. Given that he constitutes an infinitesimal segment of society, the individual justifiably expects his own wish to have no perceptible influence on society's choice. This does not mean that he disregards his private preference. As we shall see, he accords it an important, though roundabout, role in his preference declaration decision.
The second consideration that enters the individual's decision process is the utility associated with his publicly declared preference, which I shall denote by yi, and refer to as his public preference. This utility is captured by his 'reputation' function, which is given by fo (so) if yj =o,
Another significant feature is that the utility conferred by a given pressure group increases with the size of this group's following. The rationale for this specification is that people fortify their reputation as supporter of a given cause by rewarding other supporters and by withdrawing favours from opponents.6 The final consideration in the individual's preference declaration decision is the utility he derives from integrity. To the extent that y' differs from x', he compromises his integrity and thereby incurs a utility loss. His utility from integrity is represented by N(x', y') = N(i -jxi-yi|),
which is increasing in its argument, i -Ix -yl. This argument, which measures the proximity of the individual's public and private preferences, assumes a value between o and i. The nearer they are, the closer the value to i. Given the multitude of non-activists, the individual non-activist has reason to expect his personal influence on the outcome of the collective choice process to be negligible. Thus, he effectively maximises a function such as V'(x', y') = R ( y') + N(x', y'),
which incorporates the reputational and integrity components of his utility function, but not the direct benefit component. Two points need to be recognised. First, the absence of Bi(p) from the right-hand side of (4) does not imply that the individual's private preference ordering has no impact on his public declaration; it does have an impact, since x', which depends on the shape of Bi(p), appears in the argument of N(.). Second, although by assumption the non-activists have the same reputation and integrity functions, they may well have different private preferences and, hence, different maximands. The share variables so and sl, which enter (4) through the reputation function, are not necessarily known with precision. Let us assume, for simplicity, that everyone employs the same point estimates, so and s4 . Using these, each individual computes (4) under three alternatives: supporting p = o, supporting p = i, and revealing his private preference.7 The corresponding utility levels can be denoted by VO, VI, and V*.
To present the argument clearly, I focus on the case where, for all i, max (V, V') > V*
which is to say that supporting either p = o or p = i constitutes the dominant option for all the non-activists.8 In this setting, expectations can be assumed to satisfy the condition So+S= I,
6 This rationale is developed at length in Kuran (I987 a, sect. 3). The gist is that an individual claiming to support a cause comes across as insincere unless his words are reflected in his behaviour. Thus, to be perceived as an opponent of apartheid, it is not sufficient to pay lip service to the principle of racial equality. Words must be buttressed with concrete actions, such as applauding an anti-apartheid speaker or demonstrating against a company doing business in South Africa.
7 All other options are dominated by correct preference revelation, because R(y') = o for o < y' < i, and because N(x2, yi) is maximised when y' = xi. 8 For a more general analysis, see Kuran (I987a). 
Equilibrium
Now let ?D(x) be the cumulative density function of the non-activists' private preferences. This function, depicted in Fig. 2 by a light curve, is defined to provide, for any x, the share of non-activists with a private preference greater than this x. The heavy curve, which I shall call the thresholdfunction and denote by x((sl), separates, for each sl, the private preferences for which supporting p = o is optimal from those for which supportingp = I is optimal. Its downward-sloping segment is precisely the function x(Sl), as depicted in Fig. i . It also has a horizontal segment, which serves to indicate that if s' ever rises above o-8, p = I will enjoy unanimous support. (A horizontal segment along the top axis would signal that if sl ever became sufficiently low, all would support p = o.) The reason for working with x(sl), rather than x(sl), is that this facilitates geometric interpretation. The assumptions of the model guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, and there may be many.1" The case shown in Fig. 2 , for instance, features three equilibria. One of these is S&, = 0o2; if everyone believes that exactly 20 % will supportp = I, then the 20 % whose private preferences exceed 0o75 will actually do so, while the 8o % whose private preferences lie below o075 will support p = o. It is stable, since an expectational displacement in either direction would generate further revisions resulting in its re-establishment. By analogous reasoning, one can show that S'l = I also constitutes a stable equilibrium. The third equilibrium, SAl = o-6, is unstable.
Which equilibrium is attained depends on individuals' initial share expectations, since these help determine how much pressure on behalf of each group is ultimately exerted. Not that the pressure groups' initial strengths are imma- Suppose, as a start, that the leftmost equilibrium has been attained and that society has adopted the corresponding policy, 0-2. If the threshold and cumulative density functions remain fixed, this policy will exhibit complete continuity: period after period, society will choose p = 0-2. Is this an indication of collective conservatism? Yes, in the sense that if past realisations of the underlying shares were suddenly forgotten, p = 02 would not necessarily be retained. In particular, any initial SA > o'6 would lead to the adoption of p = o-6 or p = I. But since an individual's utility depends on the shares, he would not just forget their realisations -least of all recent ones that have confirmed his prior expectations. With everyone fitting into this mould, self-confirming expectations will be retained indefinitely, and the other two viable policies, p = o-6 and p = I, will not even get tested. What if, though, society had originally adopted either p = o-6 or p = i, instead ofp = 0o2? By the same logic, it would hold onto this particular policy, thereby exhibiting collective conservatism.
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Returning for a moment to the case discussed, I ought to point out that the 8o % who support p = o in one period do so in the next as well, and that the same goes for the 20 % who support p = I. This does not imply that an individual is personally attached to his own earlier choices. Free of personal conservatism, he does not give special consideration to past choices in maximising his utility. Let us consider now the consequence of disturbing the system depicted in Fig. 2 . A disturbance could entail a shift in either the cumulative density function of private preferences, or the threshold function, or both. The density function could shift because of a technological discovery, a change in the physical environment, a price shock, the emergence of a new externality, the influx of ideas from other societies, a transformation in a pressure group's efficiency in transmitting information, or population growth, among other possibilities.12 The threshold function could shift because, for instance, a group becomes more efficient at punishing its opponents, or the non-activists come to derive greater utility from integrity on the issue in question."3
The set of equilibria is not necessarily altered by such functional shifts. But even when it is, the observed shares of support may remain unaffected. Moreover, if the shares do change, they do so under the influence of the past.
Suppose, to illustrate the argument, that in Fig. 2 the established equilibrium is S = i. Due to exogenous shocks, everyone eventually comes to perceive a greater direct benefit from p = o than from p = i, causing the cumulative density function to take the form given in Fig A second case where the pre-disturbance equilibrium, Si = I, is contained in the post-disturbance set of equilibria is portrayed in Fig. 4 . Here the density function is the same as in Fig. 2 , but the threshold function has shifted to the right, because the group advocating p = o has become more efficient at delivering reputational utility to its supporters. Again, no one shifts to p = o, and society remains in equilibrium at S = i. All would support p = o if enough others were to do so, but this does not become known. Let us take up, finally, a case where the pre-disturbance outcome is not contained in the post-disturbance set of equilibria. Such a case is provided by Fig. 5, where, relative to Fig. 2 , the cumulative density function has shifted in such a way as to move the leftmost equilibrium rightward. So suppose society was previously in equilibrium at Sl = 0,2. After the shift, this expectation is no longer sustainable, since, as the dotted arrows in Fig. 5 indicate, it causes the actual share to be 0o3. In accordance with the adjustment pattern outlined in Section I, Si will rise toward 0o3. But the new expectation will also prove to be unsustainable, and further upward revisions will be necessary until S reaches 0o4. At this point, a new equilibrium is in place. Note that S = 0o4 is the postdisturbance equilibrium closest to the pre-disturbance equilibrium, Si = 0'2. This outcome, a reflection of the fact that the pre-disturbance equilibrium determines the initial post-disturbance expectation, ensures that the policy response is the smallest possible response.14 Table I lists o-I for each of the equilibria in Figs 2-5. The essential point to note is that the degree of instantaneous collective conservatism associated with an equilibrium is higher the smaller the probability that under historical amnesia it would have been attained. In Fig. 2 , for instance, o-I is higher for I than for 0o2, because if all initial expectations are equally probable, i is less likely to be selected than 02.
The table also illustrates how functional shifts affect the degree of instantaneous collective conservatism. Take the situation where the o-I associated with p = I rises from o048 in Fig. 2 to o07 in Fig. 3 . This has a simple interpretation: as individuals' private preferences move away from p = i, the range of initial expectations generating this policy narrows, implying that its retention comes to depend more heavily on the pull of the past. 
IV. ADAPTATION OF PRIVATE PREFERENCES
Up to this point, people's private preferences have been predetermined. This has meant that it would take an exogenous shock to shatter an established equilibrium and alter the degree of collective conservatism. Removing the assumption that private preferences are exogenous to the system, I shall now develop the paradoxical argument that the persistence of preference falsification can cause the degree of conservatism to fall. The crux of this argument is that following a policy's adoption, an individual privately opposed to it might come to support it both publicly and privately. The argument rests on the observation that the evolution of an individual's private preference is guided by justifications others give for their public preferences.
The Because of his cognitive limitations, a person is able to formulate educated belief systems concerning a minute portion of the phenomena that bear on his happiness. Out of biological necessity, he must rely largely on beliefs conveyed by others. This dependence is the focus of a vast segment of the psychology literature. From our standpoint, the significant finding is that for any given opinion, frequency of exposure serves as a major criterion of validity."9 The number of repetitions an individual hears of an opinion is likely to depend on the number of people conveying it. One would expect, in particular, that the greater the number of people who appear to hold a given opinion, the more validity it will assume.20
It is necessary at this point to distinguish between an individual's private belief system and his public belief system. Embodying his true convictions, his private belief system is what underlies his direct benefit function. It may never become 18 (I973) call the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut whereby subjective familiarity gets equated with validity. Another is that they believe, as implied by the saying 'four eyes see better than two', that people are unlikely to fall into identical errors. 20 This was recognised by James Madison (I 787-8/ I96I, p. 349), a founding father of the United States. He wrote: '[T]he strength of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number 'which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated.' THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [SEPTEMBER known to others. His public belief system, on the other hand, embodies the convictions he conveys in public. Like his public preference, it is influenced by reputational considerations. The distinction just drawn implies that the individual engages in belief falsification. It is reasonable to assume that this mirrors his preference falsification, since in many contexts appropriate argumentation is a precondition for meaningful preference declaration. Indeed, to make his preference declaration convincing, a person will generally need to back up his endorsement with appropriate substantive arguments. He must provide reasons, that is, as to why he expects the policy he ostensibly supports to fulfil his objectives most closely; his public belief system must be geared toward making his public preference look reasonable. An example may help clarify what the assumption involves. Someone who says he favours an import quota for textiles, but who gives the impression that he subscribes unequivocally to the doctrine of free trade, will fail to convince his audience that he really favours a quota. To be convincing, he must offer a reason, like the high costs of resource reallocation, as to why a departure from this doctrine is in this instance desirable.
A survey of this research is provided by Markus and Zajonc (i985). '9 See Hasher et al. (I977), Montmollin (I977), and Schwartz (I982). One explanation for this finding is that in their deliberations, individuals rely on what Tversky and Kahneman
Four new assumptions have been introduced, which, as we turn to their implications for collective conservatism, bear reiteration. First, individuals rely on each others' beliefs. Second, the relative influence of a particular belief depends on the share of society that asserts it. Third, an individual disguises a private belief when he expects thereby to benefit. And fourth, his belief falsification mirrors his preference falsification. For expositional clarity, it is useful to specify a temporal scheme for the various adjustments under consideration. So suppose that the unit period contains two subperiods. In the first of these, which is of length c < i, individuals' private belief systems and, hence, their private preferences adapt to the most recent distribution of public opinions. In the second, which is of length I-C, the distribution of private preferences is fixed, and individuals' public preferences adapt and readapt until an equilibrium is attained. The postulated temporal scheme is depicted in Fig. 6 for two full periods. At the end of each full period, the figure indicates, public preferences are in temporary equilibrium. The equilibrium is not necessarily permanent, for it may be destroyed once private preferences adapt to it. We are prepared now to explore the evolution of private preferences and the implications of this evolution for society's policy choice and the degree of collective conservatism. It is instructive to begin with the case of corner equilibria. Later, we shall take up the more challenging case of interior equilibria. 
Interpretation
It is paradoxical that when a policy becomes fixed, the degree of collective conservatism can fall to zero. But the explanation is simple. If the only selfconfirming expectation is that associated with the status quo, the status quo would be retained even if people were to forget that p = i commands unanimous support. The observed policy continuity owes nothing, therefore, to the pull of the past. Let us be clear about the sequence of events involved. Once a public consensus forms in favour ofp = i, debate becomes one-sided, featuring arguments only in support of i. This climate of opinion causes those privately opposed to amend their convictions. Eventually all come to see p = I as the most desirable policy. At this point, society has lost touch, in effect, with the fact that its destiny could be different. It sees the status quo as self-explanatory -not an artifact of social experimentation, but inherent in nature itself.
The activists advocating p = I are major beneficiaries of the described capture of the non-activists' minds. As we have seen, however, the key role in this capture is played not by them but by the mass of non-activists, who, by withholding their personal convictions from one another, distort the climate of opinion. This point is significant in view of the fact that policies benefiting special interest groups -sectoral subsidies, trade barriers -often receive the sympathy of a large majority. The argument just advanced links this puzzling phenomenon to the process by which members of the majority form their views of the world. This is not to say that the special interest groups play no role. They most certainly do, if only by manipulating the non-activists' information base. But such manipulation is possible precisely because the non-activists' cognitive limitations make their minds capturable.
The discussion should not be taken to imply that ifp = I ever gets established, it will be maintained forever. The whole exercise abstracts from factors pulling people's private preferences apart, such as changes in environmental conditions, the inevitable diversity of people's experiences, and opportunities for forming new pressure groups. In practice, the gravitation of preferences toward I could be arrested by a shock that propels private preferences away from i.
Nothing has been said concerning the speed of the process by which private preferences respond to the climate of opinion. There is reason to believe, though, that this process can be slow: studies indicate that people exhibit resistance to information inconsistent with their belief systems.2" Accordingly, the discussed sequence of events could play itself out over many decades or centuries, with shifts in the distribution of private preferences taking place primarily across generations. It should now be apparent why the degree of collective conservatism associated with a corner equilibrium need not converge over time to o. If the threshold function has a horizontal segment encompassing the opposite corner, it will converge to a positive number. In the present case, for instance, the degree of collective conservatism associated with the equilibrium sl = o converges to 0.2.22 This is not so say that from period T onwards the degree of collective conservatism must decrease monotonically. While it must ultimately fall to 0-2, it could rise for a while, depending on how shifts of the cumulative distribution function affect the other equilibria in the system. Table 2 shows that in the example depicted in Figs. 8 and 9 , a rise does occur at T+ 2. It also shows that the degree of instantaneous collective conservatism rises at T+ i, before falling at T+ 2. These outcomes reflect the fact that our measures depend on all policies supported by self-sustaining expectations, not just those society adopts. In our example, not only does the leftmost member of the set of equilibria change over time, but the middle member changes as well.
Relying as it does on a particular example, this analysis lacks generality. The issue deserves to be taken up in a setting equipped to isolate the effect on the 22 In Fig. 9 an sl below o-8 Note first that Fig. 8 is consistent with (I 7) . Since the equilibrium sl T = 04 is stable, and since 0-4 = YT < x(O-4) = o-65, it must be the case, according to (I 7)) that l T+1 < S1 T. This is what we found. We also found that s1 T+2 < Sl T+1) which follows from the fact that the equilibrium sl T+1 = 0?3 is stable and that 0-3 = YT+1 < X(ON3) = 0-75. The second point to observe in (I 7) is that the status quo will not be disturbed if yt = sl t. Even in this case, though, the distribution of private preferences will evolve, in that all private preferences will gravitate toward yt.23
Another Implication
The preceding discussion suggests that except in special circumstances, an interior equilibrium will give way to a corner equilibrium. The significance of this finding lies in the fact that a corner equilibrium has permanence: it is immune to endogenous private-preference adaptations. Once a corner equilibrium is established, in other words, there is no return. Not only does debate cease, but as a result, the possibility of future debate diminishes. I ought to reemphasise that I have deliberately ignored processes that pull people's beliefs and preferences apart. In practice these interfere with the homogenisation process just analysed. The value of a social theory lies in its ability to illuminate social phenomena. To demonstrate the merits of this one, I shall consider India's caste system, which has puzzled countless historians, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and economists. My concern is with the process by which the system has for millennia been maintained.24 It is a fact that defenders of the system have included the lower castes, even the so-called untouchables. I take it as a challenge to explain this intriguing fact. A good starting-point is a theory developed by Akerlof (I976, I980). It rests on two observations: first, that castes are economically interdependent; and second, that Indian society penalises the owners, operators, and consumers of firms that assign their low-caste employees to the lucrative tasks reserved for high castes. Everyone, according to the argument, recognises that the cost of production would decline if producers substituted low-for high-caste labour. Groups of firms, workers, and consumers wish, therefore, that they could collude to break the system. But the formation of anti-caste coalitions is hindered by the free-rider problem: given that the individual member of an economically viable coalition would be ostracised by the larger society from the moment he joined, his expected private gain from joining could be negative, even if he knew for sure that the coalition would form. With all potential members of a coalition fearing that it is doomed to failure, failure becomes a selffulfilling prophecy, and the system survives unscathed.
Although enlightening, this theory overlooks the fact that social sanctions are aimed not just at actions against the system but also at expressions of disagreement. The evidence indicates that traditional Indian society discourages inquiries into the rationale for the caste system and that it aims to conceal disagreements, whether over general characteristics of the system or over its particular manifestations. In caste and village assemblies, protests and assertions of difference are discouraged, apparently in order to foster the image of a harmonious society. Conflicts over caste matters are often settled by caste leaders through deals made behind the scenes. Also significant is the fact that in meetings, voting takes place by a show of hands, not by secret ballot.25
The theory developed in Sections I and II sheds light on these realities. Caste leaders, who have a stake in the system, must expect to gain from the appearance of harmony, as this would lower would-be reformists' estimates of the potential opposition. the discouragement of inquiry, it betrays a fear that questions will be interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction with the status quo.26 These arguments link the stability of the caste system to the fact that its potential opponents do not air their opposition and doubters of its wisdom do not publicise their doubts. To the extent that these factors do come into play, the existence of economically viable anti-caste coalitions will remain a secret.
A related problem with Akerlof's theory is that it assumes, in effect, that most Indians feel shackled by the prevailing system. But in reality, even the untouchables tend not to consider themselves oppressed. Regarded as 'polluted', they are barred from living in the village proper, from drawing water from the village well, and from entering Hindu temples. Yet they tend to consider these restrictions neither exploitative nor offensive.27 Many an untouchable apparently believes, in accordance with the doctrine of Karma, that his inferiority is the result of mistakes he committed in his former lives, and that if he accepts his present station and patiently fulfils his duties, he will move into a higher caste in his next life. Having imbibed the Hindu teachings about reincarnation and the inter-caste mobility of souls, he genuinely feels that he is best off working with the system, not fighting it.28 In terms of the model of this paper, his direct benefit is maximised by retention of the caste restrictions.
Why have the untouchables continued, generation after generation, to accept a set of beliefs that sanctifies their subjection and degradation? Akerlof's theory provides no answer. Such beliefs do not have a place in it, except as an exogenous factor influencing people's payoffs. A possible explanation is offered, however, by the argument in Section IV.
To get started, let us travel back a couple of millennia, to a time when the system was still in formation. We know that at first various groups fought the restrictions placed on them.29 Evidently, alternative systems were openly being considered, which suggests that under the right expectations concerning public preferences, some other system might have been adopted and retained. If this inference is valid, it follows that the degree of collective conservatism associated with the caste system's retention was once large.
Moving forward in time, we begin to observe that punishments are meted out to those openly proclaiming their opposition to the system, even those simply questioning its wisdom. These punishments ensure that most opponents keep their private preferences and beliefs to themselves. As a result, new generations grow up hearing much in favour of the system and almost nothing against it. Their thought processes vitiated by the climate of opinion, they come to see the desirability of the inherited order as self-evident. Reaching the modern 26 A person does not ordinarily raise questions about matters he regards as fully settled. He does not inquire into the wisdom of the implicit policy of allowing people to have a roof over their heads, because it never enters his mind that the policy might be undesirable. 27 This explanation for the caste system's persistence differs fundamentally from some theories that enjoy great popularity in India. In these theories, some of which bear the influence of contemporary Marxism, the stability of the caste system and of the beliefs associated with it are attributed simply to the power of the dominant castes.31 Here, in contrast, the focus is on processes by which all the castes jointly strengthen the system. The lower castes, it is argued, play a vital role in preserving the status quo, by holding back their opposition and, in the process, shackling their own minds.
VI. FURTHER REMARKS
The foregoing arguments rest on distinctions between private and public preferences and between private and public beliefs. The first distinction explains why societies retain policies they might have abandoned if not for the pull of the past. The two together explain why adopted policies condition people's perceptions and wants. The model uncovers a tendency for beliefs and preferences to become homogenised. Such outcomes may be sought intentionally by some. But they are ultimately caused by multitudes of individual decisions made without an awareness of where they will lead. Outcomes are not necessarily socially optimal. In contrast to popular approaches that attribute social optimality to every outcome, this one explicitly allows for suboptimality.
In recognising that people depend on each other for their beliefs about how the world works, the model confers to the process of belief formation an important role in the collective decision process. It does so without compromising the principle that social phenomena are to be explained by individual choices. Using the methodology of individualism, the basis of modern economics, it makes endogenous a variable that economics has traditionally treated as exogenous.
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